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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The main problem of this thesis concerns a dramatic shift in

American foreign policy vis-a-vis Moxico which took place in late
1923 and early 1924»

Alvaro Obreeon assumed the office of President

of Mexico in December, 1920 during a most critical period in Mexican

history.

Respite economic chaos t high unemployment and chronic

political instability which resulted from ten years of revolution,
the United States Government refused to recognize the ubreeon regime*

Recognition might have brought some semblance of order to Mexico as
this would have meant financial assistance from the United States

which was needed to repair and rebuild factories, mines and railroads*
However, Secretary of State Hughes declared on June 3, 1921 that
Obreffon would have to sicn a proposed Treaty of Amity and Commerce

which would settle for once and for all the problems facinc American
investors in Mexico which resulted from the Constitution of 1917 and

Carranza's decrees from 1915 to 1920.*

It

was directly implied by

Hughes that all of the benefits which would accrue from recognition

would only be forthcoming after the proposed treaty was signed.

i?or

a number of reasons, including national priae and definitely estab-

lished precedents of international law, Obregon refused to submit to

sketch of the proposed treaty see United States Department of 3 to Foreim Relations of the United States . 1921 lY^shin«rton
1935), II, 397-404. nereafter cited as Forelf^n Relations.
•^For a

f

such an agreement.

Thus began a period of stalemate and animosity be-

tween the two governments which lasted for nearly three years as
Obregon's constitutionally elected government was deni^ recognition
1

.

"by

the Harding Administration until the clauses in the Constitution of

1917 relating to oil and mines and Carranza's tax decrees had been
settled to our satisfaction*
The thaw in relations developed when the Bucareli Conference,

which was held in Mexico City, settled the outstanding questions between the two governments at least for a brief period of time*

Recog-

nition was extended to the Obregon Government on Atigust 31, 1923 and
the text of the agreement was signed by both governments on September?.

There can be no doubt that recognition was obtained by Obregon because

of the proceedings at tho Bucareli Conference*

One of the important

problems to be investigated is the reaction of the State Department,
the Administration, and the American press to this agreement which was

reached after a series of secret conferences*

Was this simply a first

step taken by Hughes in an attempt to restore normal relations with

Mexico which would allow us to retreat from the inflexible position
that we had assumed in regard to the proposed treaty?

Cur earlier

position had created some embarrassment for the Administration*

This

was especially true in this country as most of the western states which
were usually antagonistic towards Mexico favored recognition.

The true

officials
test of what tho Bucareli agreement really meant to American

came shortly thereafter*
la Huerta
On December 6, 1923 a serious revolt led by Adolf o do
regime.
broke out in Mexico, threatening to topple the Obregon

The

a

Ceolidge Administration had a crucial decision to make as the month of

December progressed because Hughes* a initial assessment of the situation proved incorrect.

On January 7, 1924 Coolldge signed an embargo

proclamation which indicated tnat w© intendod to place our resources
at the disposal of Obregon while denying at the same time the oppor-

tunity for the de la Huorta faction to buy munitions in the United
States*

A number of questions immediately arise which must be answered
if this dramatic shift in policy is to be adequately explained.

TOiy

did the United States decide to aid Obregon after refusing to recog-

nize him for nearly three years?

Did we aid the Mexican Government in

its time of peril because of the agreement reached at the Bucareli

Conference?

The factors which led Coolidge and Hughes to their de-

cision must be given close scrutiny, not only because it represented
a dramatic change in our previous policy in relation to Mexico, but
also because It emphasizes a problem which every foreign offico is

faoed with, namely how much weight should be attached to the reports
sent by their diplomatic representatives in that country.

Questions arise as well as to how our policy was implemented.
What kind of aid did we extend to the Obregon Government and how effective were United States agents in denying the Implements of war to
the rebels?

Would victory have been possible for the Federal troops

without American assistance and did Hughos impose conditions on
Obregon in return for our aid?

Even of greator importance, one must

inexamine tho thesis of Latin American historian Howard Ollne who
in the
ferred that the United States government directly intervened

t

4

struggle to Insure Obregon* s victory.

Cline charged

Ho (Obregon) was savod from dofoat primarily by prompt aid
from tho Unltod States In the form of arms and actual

military cooperation*
Seventeon United States planes
bombed the do la Huorta revolutionaries in Jalisco for him. ^
1

This serious charge must be carefully examinod to see the United States

did directly intervene in the domestic affairs of our neighbor

our choice from ultimate defeat.

Finally,

I

,

to save

intend to review the re-

action Ox the Amorlcan press and public which was instrumental in

forcing the Administration t© explain fully its decision to aid Obregon
to defend itself against its critics.

Also, it must bo seen if domestic

oritics, especially In Congress, were ablo to have any moderating in-

fluence on tho Administration* s implementation of our policy*
finphasis must be placed on tho reasons for our decision to aid

Obregon.

The United States decision in 1923 cannot be considered In

&

vacuum but must bo compared with our earlier decisions in Latin America

when political instability erupted.

TSas

Cline correct in implying that

this wag a return to a form of "gunboat diplomacy** where American

troops were used to insure that American lives and property were pro-

tected?

Is it possible that this decision marked a return to tfllson*s

basic philosophy, as expressed in his Mobile address, that democratic
governments should be fostered In Latin America oven if intervention

was required?

Did Obregon receive our assistance because of his at-

wealth by introtempts to bring about a more equitable distribution of

ducing such measures as land reform?

Thirdly, American aid might have

regime bo allowed to
been extended to insure that a stable, orderly
2 Heward F. Cline, Th« United St *t„* and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.,

1953), p. 208.

—

5
ll

—

t-

...

continue In power*

,

Did this represent a more subtle use of our inter-

national police power" to maintain in power governments that had come
to terms with American officials?

Instead of sending American units

into the field, had we now improved on Boosevelt f s

"big*

stick* by sup-

plying the legal government with munitions while denying the seme to
those who threatened the peace and stability of the country no matter

what the latter* s reasons were for starting the insurrection?

In con-

elusion, it must be seen whether Hughes fully defined what his policy

encompassed*

A series of general statements which were not specifically

explained could lead to misuse of Hughes* s policy in the future*

Since

Hughes did depart somewhat from the oarlier American policy towards

Latin America (especially Harding's policy), tho burden rested with him
to make sure that his policy would not be distorted in the future be-

cause he failed to specifically define its limits and exceptions*
This topic is also of general concern today because it raised the

problem of our attitude towards the right of revolution*

This question

presented a perplexing problem, especially since 1900, as the United

States had reached the position of a major world power in Latin America
who, of course, was interested in maintaining the status quo*

On the

other hand, our past history brought about the espousal of numerous
theories which justified revolution not only to ourselves but to the

whole world.

Every revolution, especially in our so-called "sphere ef

idea that
influence** of Latin America, started a debate between the

world,
revolution is Justified, unless it is financed by another snjwr

because it brings
power, and the thesis that revolution is unjustified
in its

.*

political instability and economic chaos.

If Itoited States

=

6

officials fool that the revolution is not Justified. Mother right or

wrong, the question of intervention arises*

made to intervene the question arises as to
will take*

Once the decision has been
Tshich mode of action rm

Should Intervention ho direct to insure a

cpxlclc

solution or

should It he indirect so It will ho possible to camouflage our Inten-

tions to maintain the image of non-intervention on our part?

Those

perplexing problems of revolution and Intervention mast be kept in

mind if this problem is to be examined in the correct perspective*

CHAPTER II

BUGABEL I

CaWERMCE

From 1921 to 1923 tho Obregon Government made a long list of concessions in accordance with scmo of tho terms of the proposed Treaty of

Amity and Commerce*

However, despite the concessiens Obregon still re-

fused to sign the proposed treaty* 3

By the beginning ef 1923 two

things still stood in the way of immediato recognition of the Mexican

Government by the United States.

Huglios still

wanted to have some ef

these basic guarantees in writing to incur© that the favorable conditions given te the United States by the Obregon government would not

be repealed by his successor*

If he could not persuade Obregon te sign

a treaty* he could perhaps obtain tho signature of the Mexican govern-

ment on some ether document which would effectively substitute for the
treaty and thus, bind future governments in Mexico te adhere te the
terms ef the agreement*

Secondly, the United States believed that

numerous loopholes still remained which would only cause trouble in the
future if they weron*t solved now*

V/e

wanted to be positive about the

attitude ef the Mexican government on oil lands acquired after May 1,
1917 j the method of payment for American owned agricultural lands

which were expropriated; and the establishment of a commission to inS

For Obregon* s objections to signing the treaty see Foreign Relations . 1921 (Washington. 1935), II, p. 645. For a review of tho concessions see Foreign Halations . 1923 ( Washington) , II, 526-32*

5

veatigate the claims of our citizens against the l^xican government.
Thus, the last thing needed "before recognition would bece-e an
accem-

plished fact was for the representatives ef both governments te sit
down and scire these last two problems.
Despite an earlier statement b7 Cbregon that he vrould net agree
te any meeting with the United States until his government was recog-

nized, he consented to a meeting of the personal representatives ef
each President which began on Hay 14, 1923."

Charles 3.

warren and

John Payne represented President Harding and Cbregon appointed P-amon

Bosas and Fernando Hoa as his personal representatives.

Che original

purpose of the conference was to conclude a claims convention

so

American citizens could receive compensation for lives lost and property destroyed during the ten years of revolution in Hexico.

claims convention would satisfy

cr.e

This

of the basic guarantees required by

the United States before it would extend recognition to Cbregon.

Horo-

ever, Hughes insisted that he was unable to see any reason why assur-

ances should not be given as wo 11 in respect te the protection of other
fundamental interests.

5

^»

the scope of the convention broadened te

include other outstanding questions which existed between the two

governments.

Hughes noted threo major problems which he instructed

TJarron to discuss with the Mexican commissioners.

These were«

To the obtaining of satisfactory assurances against
First.
confiscation of the subsoil interests in lands owned by

4 Uhited States, Department of State P^cords of the D«rartment of
State P.glatir.r to the Internal Affairs cf Mexi co 1910-192? (V^shington,
Eereafter re1959), 812.00/25430, Yargas to Colby, February 17, 1921.
ferred to as the Internal Affairs of h'oxico .
5A.

H.

Feller, The L'exican Claims Commission (How York, 1935),

p. 22.

American citizens prior to May 1, 1917. Second. To the
restoration of proper reparation for the taking of lands
owned by American citizens. • • Third. To the making of
an appropriate claims convention. 6
The work of the Bucaroli Conference concluded on August 15, 1923

with the submission of the drafts of the Spocial and General Claims
Convention to Presidont Obregon and to President Coolidge.
The first problora concerned American owned proporty which was

acquired beforo the Constitution of 1917 went into effect on May 1,
1917.

The United States demanded that oil lands be returned to their

rightful owners or that adequate compensation be made for those lands

which had been seized for failure to comply with Carranza's decrees.

7

In the case of agrarian lands which wore expropriated for reasons of

public utility, the United States insisted that payment be made in

each instead of "worthless bonds'* as proposed by Article 27 of the
8
Mexican Constitution of 1917.

Compensation should be paid on the

basis of the market value of the property.

This was contrary to the

Mexican position, as outlined in the Constitution, that compensation
be based on its value assessed for tax purposes plus ton per cent.
On these two points the American commissioners won almost a complete

victory.

(

According to Article EC of the claims conventions, "...the

amount to be paid would be determined by deducting one governments
6 Foreim Kolationa . 1923

(Washington, 1938), II, 543.

Carranza
For a complete picture of the most obnoxious decrees of
and Foreign
see Foroira Rolatlons . 1919 (Washington, 1934), p. 593
Belations . 1918 ( Y&shington, 1932), p. 737.
7

translation of the Constitution of 1917 can be
Rolatlons . 1917 (Washington, 1930), pp. 951-79.

8 The complete

found

ir

10

total from the other's total and then payment would bo made in
9
geld*"

Of course, the Mexican Government could avoid payment by
irrraediately

returning the land which had been expropriated. 10

This amounted to the

establishment of special privileges for American citizens in Mexico*
Their property would most likely be valued at a higher level by the conn

promise which was reached than would bo the case if the Mexican plan was
the basis of determining the value of the property*

But of even greater

importance* Americans would receive cash payments instead of bonds in

return for their property.

Ho other nationality group in Mexico, in-

cluding Mexicans, would receive cash for their property as they were
forced to accept the bonds as payment*

This was contrary to the Calvo

clause which stated that aliens were not entitled to more than the

treatment which was accorded to nationals* 11

This was an extremely high

price that Obregon had to pay for recognition and Article IX was sub-

jected to severe criticism when the terms of the conventions became
public knowledge* 12
In the case of the oil lands, the United States received from the

Mexican commissioners a restatement of the decision that had been

reached in the Texas Oil Case which made the Mexican Supreme Court decision more binding!

This decision was not unfavorable to American oil

companies and inclusion of this decision in the conventions eliminated

Q

Feller,
10

11

12

j>£*

cit *

pp* 312-313*

,

New York Times . August 16, 1923, p*
Feller,

j>£»

cit *

,

6*

p* 185*

Hew York Times , Decembor 21* 1923, p* 3*

11

two of tho major American reservations about the case. 13

Briefly, the

Mexican commissioners agreed that Article 27 would net have a retroactive effect on land where some positive act had been performed prior
to May 1, 1917.

If an American citizen had entered into a lease to

obtain the land or had started surveying or drilling the land prior to
May 1, 1917, this was considered to be sufficient evidence of his intention to explore for oil and thus, this land was not subject
fiscation.

to

con-

The Mexican commissioners insisted that land en which no

positive act had been performed prior fo May 1, 1917 would be retro-

actively affected and the rights to such land would revert to the
nation.

.

But they did agree that the former owners of such land would

be granted preferential rights to the oil in the subsoil to the exclu-

sion of any third party who had no title to the land«^

Oil lands

which fell into this category would have to comply with the provisions
of Article 27 and also with Carranza's decrees.

Thus, if no positive

act had been initiated, ownership would be conditional in nature*
Since the Mexican Government owned the land, it was quite evident that
the nation could in tho future refuse to grant permission to drill on
its land and thus, these who held titles to such lands were really

concessionaires.
However, the United States commissioners did not agree with this

*3

For a translation of the Texas Company case see Foreign Relations . 1921 (7*tshington, 1935), XX, 462-72. For a roviow of sorao of the
major American objections to the decision see the Now York Tlmog.
April 14, 1922, p. 10.

14

BenJamln H. Williams, Economic Foreign Policy of the Unltod
States (New York, 1929), p. 115.

th,

15

recognition for the Obrogoi Gevernment.

Hormal relations had boon re-

established between the two countries for th© first
time since May 21,
1920.

It

ma

remarkable that Obregon was able to remain in power
from

December, 1920 until August, 1923 without the material and
moral support

ef the United States and this is a testament to his ability and
shrewdness*

Ohere was, however, a slight disagreement which preceded formal

recognition of the Obregon Government by the United States.

Xh« United

States wanted recognition and the signing of the two conventions to

occur almost simultaneously. 22

On the other hand, Obregon wantod recog-

nition to precede the signing of the Conventions by at loast a week and
also, he wanted recognition by August 31, 1923 so Obregon could announce
to the opening session of Congress on the next day that

Jiiexic©

had been

recognized "without having to enter into details that perhaps would be
best to omit for the time being." 23

Obregon hoped that recognition

would occur before the text of the agreement was made public.

It was

duo not only to the fact that Obregon feared that the extensive series
of concessions he had to make for recognition would become public know-

ledge too soon but also bocauso he did not want it to appear that the
General and Special Claims Convention were simply a substitute for the

Treaty of Amity and Commerce.

It would be most unfortunato if

a public

furor erupted before recognition was extended as it might undermine the

negotiations of the last few months.

She request of

Jtfexice

was granted

as recognition was extended on August 31 and the conventions wore signed

2 2 Foreign Relations
1923 (Tfeshingten, 1938), II, p. 550.
,
2 3 Ibid .,

p. 552.

•

16

•n September 7.

'jhia

can be considered as a concession granted
by

Hughes bat more realistically it must be considered
as a slight techni-

cality of little importance at the time,

hashes was unaware of the

frightful censequencos which would resalt from this
technicality two

years later when Oalles was president.
What effect did the Conference have on the future relations
be-

tween

two countries?

th<*

Recognition of iiexico showed that Hughes, at

least, thought that all the troublesome questions of the past had been
satisfactorily settled.

This was unrealistic as the United States

should never have expected this agreement to be binding on future

governments in Mexico which were not subjected te the pressures that

Obregon endured.

V/hile the

United States considered the conventions

to be as binding as a treaty which would be observed by all future

governments in Mexico, the Mexican government considered the Conference
to be a gentlemen's agreement which affected the Obregon government

only. 2 **

Contributing to the later Mexican contention that tho Con-

ference represented only an exchange of views which did not limit the

sovereignty of Mexico, was the fact that the conventions were signed

after recognition had been extended to the Obregon government.

Eor

Obregon, the conference simply represented an exercise in political ex-

pediency which was necessary due to tho prevailing circumstances.

24 Charles Evans Hughes, ihe Pathway of Peace (New ? ork, 1925),

p. 98.
25Anita Branner ihe Wind That Swept Mexico (New York, 1943),
t
p. 66.
26 Frflnlr

lViTiTiftiibaum.

(How rerk, 1950), p. 268.
_

J

u

1

Mexico:

The Struffsle for Peace and Broad

17

Special privileges were extended te Americans only

-to

gain recognition

and future governments in Mexico which did not operate under the handicap of non-recognition would not have to honor obligations which had

been entered into under duress*
However, despite the long range effects of the conference which

tended to have an adverse offect on the relations between the two countries, it is more important to examine the initial reaction of the

American government, press and public to the Bucareli Conference at
least through the early part of 1924. 27

This is important

b

a

con-

temporary .American opinion in regard to the conventions would play a
large role in determining what our policy would bo when Obregon was in

danger of being overthrown*

If one examines the record, there can be

little doubt that American officials were ecstatic over the results of
the conference*

In a letter to Sonater Lodge, Hughes stated:

"The

arrangement contemplates full protection for all cases of oil- properties which were acquired after February (1917) and abandons in no re-

spect the attitude which the government has consistently maintained

with respect to property rights. 28

Even in retrospect, five years

later, when it had boon proved that the cenforonco did net settle everything, Hughes argued i

"Ihe adjustment of 1923 contained, it was be-

lieved (at least at the time), substantial assurances which wore roason-

27 For

a review of the trouble which developed later see Guy
Stevons, Current Controversies with Mexico (Now York, 1928), pp. 42-43.
28

Uhited States, Congressional Record , 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1924, LX7, Part 2, 13277"

18

ably adequate* 29

These sta&ements ware net issued

"by

a man whe had

accepted any kind ef agreement te silence his critics at heme whe favored
recognition.

On the contrary, it is obvious that Hughes believed that

the United States had net compromised her position at all and that

Obregon*s reasonable attitude pins American pressure had resulted in a

most satisfactory agreement*

President Coolidge agreed with this con-

clusion as he commended barren for a "fine piece of work, looking te
the guarantee ef peace and stabilization of economic and political re3
lations throughout the continent."

^

American newspapers, on the whole, agreed with this optimistic
assessment of the situation,

'ine

Springfield Republican editorialized

that "Secretary Hughes had succeeded in oxacting positive diplomatic

assurances that Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution*... would not be

applied retroactively to the injury of American investors in Mexican
W 21
subsoil re source s.

The Hew York Times gave most ef the credit for

the agreement to the Mexican executive as Obregon had the "points

cleared up* by subduing the rebellious minorities in Mexico who had
torpedoes other attempts in the past to bring about a reconciliation
32
between the two countries.

Only a few discordant voices, like that

pessimistic view was
of the St. Paul Dispatch, were heard but their
29 Charles Evans Hughes, Our Relatio ns te the Katlons of the
43.
Western Hemisphere (Princeton, Wow Jersey, 1928), p»
3 °Georgo Cyrus Thorpe, "The Mexican Problem Solved," North
American Review . September, 1924, p. 52.
3 1 Sprlngfi «ld. Republican . September 1, 1923, p. 8.

32
p. 15.

September 8, 1923,
"Making Up With Mexico," Literary Digest ,

19

Centrally Ignored by American peliey makers as Obregon tried te
push
the conventions through the Mexican Congress as rapidly as
possible.
In conclusion, ene cannot ©scape the fact that Americans generally

believed that nerraal relations had been restored on our terms and
that at last we had found in Mexico a reasonable man to deal with*

1

CHAPTER III

CAUSES OF THE DE LA HUERTA REVOLT

The revolt would most likely have never occurred If thoro had not

boon a presidential olootion scheduled for the spring of 1924*

Although

this is d- .ficult to prove, the history of Mexico bears witness to the

faot that it is very difficult to hold an election in a country whore

rebellion is considered the only way to gain power.

plained

i

As Tannenbaum ox-

"Revolutions (in Mexico) tend to occur before elections be-

cause the only way of assuring that tho candidate will receive an of33
ficial majority is to control tho governmont."

This was exactly

what happened in 1920, as the ©loction approached, when it became quite

obvious that Carranza intended to soo that his choice for tho presidency
34
would win instead of Obregon.

23io

rosult was a rebellion.

Since

Artiolo 83 of tho Constitution of 1917 prohibits a Prosidont frem seeking a socond consecutive torm, ho usually picks an "official candidate"
who is suro to win as tho government controls tho electoral machinery.
By tho fall of 1923 there wero two major candidates for the
presidency, both members of Obrogon^s cabinet.

'Jftey

wero former Secre-

Callos and
tary of tho Gobornacion (Internal Affairs) Plutarco Ellas

Secretary of Finance Adolf o do la Huerta.

33 Tannenbaum, op. cit .

,

p.

34 Georg© B. Winton, Mexico t

Although there was no sub-

92*

Pas t and Present (Hashville, Tenn.,

1928), p. 220.

20

.

21

stantial proof for the charge, supporters of do la
Haerta claimed that

ma

not only

Calles the official candidate which was true, hut alee

that Ubregen was coins to "impose" Calles on the country by insuring

his victory whatever the cost. 35

33ie

only historian, Omening, who has

studied the causes of the revolution in detail concluded!

"He evidence

exists that previous to the de la Haorta revolt, ho (Obregon) had

lifted a finger to •impose' Calles.

. .

n36

With two strong candidates

'

in the field a cleavage developed in ©very realm of Mexican society as

supporters of the Cbrogen Government hacked Calles while groups or

factions who felt thoy had boon mistreated by Obregon took up the cry
ef "imposition" and supported de la Huerta.

unions known as the

C

G«

T.

The latter included labor

(Confederacien General de Trabajadoros)

and the Hallway Unien, the conservative wing ef the army, and the landowners, known as the hacondades, to name just a few of the more important
In each case the above mentioned groups boliovod

groups.

th?*:

the

government's reform program, which would most likely be continued by
Calles, was harmful to them or thoy wore disastisfied because government

favor was boing bestowed on their enemies.

With the unions, they were

unhappy because Obregon cultivated the friendship of the rival

C. H.

O.

IS.

(Cenfederacien flegional Obrere Mexicana) with government funds which

subsidized its activities.

37

*

With the generals, if Obregon' s famous

"silver oannonballs" or bribes were unable to end the opposition ef the

35Brenner,

_op_.

cit .

,

p. 72.

36 Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Horltage (Hew York, 1928), p.658.

S?

:

P» 357.

"

22

conservative wing of the army (Obregen was the leader of
the liberal
wing), the generals would be transferred to a new area which was
quite

a distance from their

"basic

area of influenoe and power. 38

Finally,

Obregon»s land reform program alienated the hacendades because he

showed he would enforce the program for the first time since the agrarian decree of January, 1918 by establishing the principle that ne

longer was there "any question of the right of villages to land; the

problem was rather how to make the right effective. s9

Thus, these

groups, and others as well, joined the ranks of the revolutionaries #
The only way they could gain the favor and protection of the government

was to install their ewn man in power.

Principles were of little im-

portance as this was a struggle of the "outs" to gain power and if they
were successful they would be amply rewarded.

Another factor which can not be ignored in considering the causes
ef the revolt was the insidious "cult of personalisra" which existed in

Mexico. 48

JSaoh

leader of a factien, despite its size, had as his main

goal the furthering of his own political ambitions.

If do la Huerta,

a strong candidate, had not decided to break his oath not to run for
the presidency a revolt might have boon avoided.

41

Thrust into the

spotlight by the Lamont-de la Huerta agreement, he became the object of

attention for those who hoped to further their own ambitions by playing
38 Cline, 0£. olt.

39 Eyler

.

pp. 196-97.

Simpson, iho E.Udot
No. Car., 1937), pp. 02-03.
IT.

Mexico's

\7a.v

Out

(Chapel Hill,

40

InternaI Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26275, Summerlin to Hughes
Bulnes editorial
, i&rch 19, 1923.
4 1 Ibid

812.00/26457, Summerlin to Hughos, September 15, 1923
and 812.00/26467, Summerlin to Hughes, September 28, 1923.
. .
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en

Ma

vanity. 42

»hen ho did become a candidate, a complete breakdown

in governmental operations occurred as the only issue of
importance be-

came the presidential election.

In the legislative branch the actions

of the Callistas and the Euertistas were calculated to arouse emotions

which prevented any rational solution of the issue.

Charges flew in

both directions until the inevitable occurred when violence broke out
43
in the National Congress.
Eventually the whole country became a
battlefield.

In passing, however, it should bo noted that since per-

sonalities played such a large role in Mexican politics, it appeared
that do la Huorta would use any issue, such as the cry of imposition,
to further his ambitions.

Thus, the revolutionaries again appeared to

be devoid of any reasons which were serious enough to justify a rebellion*
The incident which brought everything into the open, namely, the

resignation of do la Huerta from the Cabinet and the announcement of

his candidacy, was the election held in the state of
en August 5, 1923.

Jian

Luis Potesl

The contest for Governor of the citato involved Mr*

Priete Laurens, a close friend ef do la wuerta, and Aurelia Manriquo,

a backer ef Oalles.

This was the first test of strength between both

forces and was a preview of the upcoming presidential election.

Laurens

was declared the winner of tho election which was described as "little
44
mere than a farce."

result, of course, was that Manrique took up

42

For details of the agreement see George Creel, The People floxt
Door (New York, 1926), pp. 361-62.
4 3 Intornal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26483, Suraraerlin to Hughes,
Ootober 19, 1923.

44

Ibid .

.

812.00/2167, Suramerlin to Hughes, September 28, 1923.
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arras in the

hopes ef reversing what he considered to be a fradulent

A civil war had begun in the state between two evenly

election.

matched forces.

Obregon decided to intervene in the struggle on Sep-

tember 22, 1923 by using his power as expressed in Article 76 of the
Constitution.

Article 76 provided the JBxecutive with the powert

"To

declare, when all the constitutional powers of any state have disap-

peared,

+

at the occasion has arisen to give to the said State a pro-

visional governor.

by the Senate. w

The appointment of such a governor shall be made

When the Senate refusod to unseat Laurens, the op-

position charged that Obregon had violated state sovereignty because
he interfered for the sole purpose of insuring the victory of a Oalles
supportor»

4e

ilio

pretext for revolution had boon established as tho

cry of imposition, the only major issue prior to and during the revolt,

was raised.

Henceforth, the situation quickly deteriorated.

General

Jj'iguero,

a supporter ef de la Huerta, was tho first to

use force against an agent of the Federal Government as he deposed
Governor Heri in Guerrero on December 2, 1923.
array

had bogun.

£ho defections in tho

Do la Huerta slipped out of the capital on December

fourth and arrived in Veracruz tho following day, after a meeting with
General Sanchez and othor military loaders, ho informed Obregon that
47
his government would no longer be recognized.

4 5Ferei«i filiations . 1917 (Washington, 1930), p. 966.

4 6 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26467, Summorlin to Hughes,
September 28, 1923.
4 7 Ibid .

.

812.00/26648, Consul Wood to Hughes, December 13, 1923.
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De la Aorta's revolutionary program was

be examined here*

interesting and should

His manifesto issued on December 9, 1923 statedt

—
—

First
•••absolute respect for the lives and liberty of the
people and for the property of Nationals as well as foreigners*
Second
Immediate reflation of Article 123* ••
(third
Justice must govern for all ov/ners of small pieces of
land who are really cultivating it, and also for the holders
of large strips of lands* ••
Seventh --Intensification of public instruction by practical
education*
The program was exceedingly vague and contained nothing: new*

If de la

Huerta believed that this manifesto would justify his revolt to American

officials, he was sadly mistaken*

For instance. Excelsior , a Mexican

newspaper which had opposed most of Obregcn f s programs, strongly con41
demned the rebellion and pleaded for general loyalty to the Government*

Since both sides were evenly matched, the reaction of the United State!
te these developments would be vital In determining the eutceme*

4 8 Kew York Times . December 10 f 1923, p* 4*
49

Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812*00/26612* Summerlin to Hughes,
Deoember 7, 1923*

CHAPTER 17

FORMULATION OP AMERICAN POLICY

United States policy must actually be divided into three stages.
The first aection will deal with American policy from September, 1923

until the outbreak of the revolution on December

5.

Of special im-

portance in this section, will ho a consideration of the reports of
our diplomatic representatives in Mexico*

it is important to note

what side our representatives favored as it was only natural for them
to he affected by the propaganda of either the Huertistas er Callistas.

Lastly, it must be seen whether the United States government took any

steps to offer a compromise solution to both sides to try and find a

peaceful solution*

If this was not done, did the State department

make any plans as to what the United States position would be when the
revolt did break out?

The second section will deal with a study of

our initial polioy after the revolt hroke out.

A

close examination

must be made of the reasons why Coolidge and Hughes decided to change
from a passive policy of watchful waiting to a policy of indirect intervention in the struggle.
JSren a

cursory examination of reports from our diplomatic repre-

sentatives in Mexico prior to December, 1923 indicated that a violent

upheaval would occur at any time.

As early as March 9, 1923 Charge

war" existed
d»Af faire Summerlin observed that a definite 'risk of civil

because of the upcoming Presidential campaign*
5 0 Ibid

.,

50

He was more explicit

812.00/26254, Summerlin to Wughes, March 9, 1923.
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27

after do la tfuerta resigned as he statedt

"!Ehe

danger to the estab-

11 shod order in a contest between two fairly evenly matched
factions

(Huertistas and Callistas) is not to be overlooked.**51

Even if of-

ficials in Washington wore unaware of the past history of Mexico when
an eleotlon approached or discounted tho earlier warnings of our
representatives, they could not have ignored the reports of our diplo-

mats in October and November, 1923 which clearly showed an increasing
pattern of violence and an apparent desire by both sides te resolve the

matter by using force.

For instance, besides describing clashes be-

tween both factions in the streets,

Suraraerlin

concluded his report of

November 1, 1923 by stating that "virtual war" existed in the Chamber

of Deputies ag deputies of both sides were wearing bullet proof vests.** 2

After further incidents in the first week of November there was almost
no doubt in Summerlin*s mind that it was only a matter of time befero
the revolt would break out.

November 16 he conoludedt

In his dispatch to the department on

"The possibility of an armed conflict aris-

ing out of the presidential contest is being taken more and more into
the calculations of Interested observers and of the public at large...

Thus, the dispatches sent by our diplomats in Mexico accurately reported
the domestic crisis which had ovolved and officials at the State .Depart-

ment should have been cognizant of the fact that a revolt would break
out and devised their policies accordingly.
5 1 lb id *. 812.00/26467, Summerlin to Hughes, September 29, 1923.
5 2 Ibid .

.

812.00/26498, Summerlin to Hughes, November 11, 1923.

^Ibid.

.

812.00/26513, Summerlin te Hughes, November 16, 1923.
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Besides describing the rapidly moving events in Mexico,
the dip-

lomatic representatives ef the United States alse divulged their inner-

mest prejudices.

Realizing that United States policy, especially in

regard to the revolt, would be determined at the highest levels in
lflashington, our charge'', and consuls in Mexico were not afraid to sug-

gest the possible outlines our policy should take.
case,

eui.

In nearly every

diplomats suggested that it v/ould be in the best interests

ef the United States if do la Huerta won.

For instance, Sumraerlin who

essentially tried to remain neutral, commented!

"In campaign manifes-

toes the Calles party regularly takes a radical and Revolutionary'

stand while the do la Huerta followers have been rather boldly conHowever, much stronger opinions were expressed.

servative."^

Consul

"It is therefore a

Lee R« Blohm was much more emphatic as he statedt

question in the mind ef the writer whether the suppression of this
revolution, if it means the rise to power of the 'agraristas* along
55
with Calles, is fer the best interest of Mexico."

proponent ef do la Huerta was Consul John F.
Veracruz where the revolt began.

7/ood

The most outspoken

who was stationed at

In his initial dealings with the

rebels he observed that do la Huerta* s officials wore "telling only the
truth" which was '*un-Mexican.

. .

5
and more in keeping with our own way."

Two weeks later V/ood directly inferred, that de la Huorta»s movement,

54 Ibid .
55

Ibid .

.

812.00/26483, Sumraerlin to Hughes, October 19, 1923.

.

Consul Blohm to the Secretary of State, December 29,

1923*
5 6 Ibid .

.

812.00/26648, Uonsul Wood to tho Secretary of State,

December 7, 1923.
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which "will be recognized as a boon to Mexico and all foreign interests,"
would bo successful in ten days if he had the necessary arms and ammunition from the United States. 57

Numerous other reports could bo

cited to demonstrate that the consuls thought that the Callista faction
was a threat to the best interests of the united States but this simply

would bo repetitious.

58

In direct contrast to this, I was unable to

find one instance of an American Consul who believed that a victory by
Callos and his eventual election would be of benefit to the United
3tates.

If Hughes acted on these reports alone, there is little doubt

that the Unitod States would have either remained neutral in the strug-

gle or have actively aided the Huertistas.
The immediate response of the State Department to the events

leading up to and including the outbreak of the revolt was one of inaction.

There is no evidence of Hughes or Ceolidge formulating any new

policy prior to tho revolt.

On© must assume that thoy either did not

believe the reports of our diplomats in Mexico that a revolt would

break out or that thoy believed it would only be a minor domestic squabble which the United States need play no part in.

No attempt was mado
v

by the United States government in the period prior to the revolt to
offer the good servicos of our Charge in an attempt to bring both factions to the conference table to work out a compromise.

57

This was por-

812.113/9376, Consul Wood to tho Secretary of State,
December 21, 1923*
Ibid .

.

instance see Ibid .. 81200/26504, Consul \feltor Boyle to tho
Consul Gaylord
Secretary of State, November 13, 1923 and 812. 00/24873,
Marsh to the Secretary of State, February 23, 1921.

^Por
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haps due to the unfortunate results which occurred in 1912
when Ambassador Henry Lane Vllson tried to negotiate a settlement prior to
the

overthrew of Madero.

\7hen

news of the revolt reached Ykshingten the

State Department did not issue any official announcement as to its intent.

As a matter of fact, the United States Government didn f t even

acknowledge publicly that they were cognizant of the situation in Mexico

until late in December.
It would be simple enough to conclude that the united States was

ignorant of events in Mexico and thus, our response was due to a frantic
search for a policy which would be suitable in this situation*

However,

as was already mentioned, the State Department was not unaware of the
trend of events in Mexioo as our representatives had clearly pointed out
that a revolt was imminent*

At the beginning, Hughes hoped that the

trouble was only local and that the revolt would be contained in Vera-

cruz and kept from spreading to the rest of Mexico*

59

V&shington bt-

lieved that Obregon would be able to weather the storm and that it would
be premature on our part to intervene in a struggle which would be

quickly concluded*

Even as late as December 19 the Administration was

f
confident ef this as the Ndw York limes reported that Coolidge s cabinet

didn*t discuss Mexico at the meeting on December 18 and "this was cited
as evidence of the faith of officials here that the present Mexican

Government will retain its power."

60

In addition, since Hughes was

5 %ew York Times * December 16, 1923, Sec. X, p. 3.
60

New York

'rimes

.

December 19, 1923, p. 3.
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cenfidtnt of a quick Obregen victory, he wanted te make
sure that the

United States took no action which could possibly involve us
in the
struggle or embarrass Cbregon.

For instance, when the United States

Consul at Manzanilla requested en December 15, 1923 a destroyer to

protect American lives and property in the face of impending disorder,
he received this reply.

Hughes informed the Consul "that the Depart-

ment is reluotant to have a war vessel call at Manzanilla unless and
until absolutely necessary.,." 61

One can argue that Hughes did this te

avoid the revival of the old days of "gunboat diplomacy" but this conclusion seems unlikely when it is compared with United States actions
the following month.
Thus, the State Department had followed a policy of watchful

waiting from December 5 to December 23, 1923.

The United States was

neutral in this period as there seemed no need for action on our part

as long as it appeared that the revolt was localized and Ubregon was to

be the victor,

The State Department instructed our diplomats in Mexico

that dealings with the rebels "should be strictly informal and unoffi-

cial."

62

Thus, although the United States was net going to recognize

their belligerency, contacts with the rebels, even though informal,

were kept open,

hven of greater importance was the fact that Hughes

did net countermand food's Instruction to American steamship agents en

61

Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26603, Hughes te the Consul
at Manzanilla, December 15, 1923.
62United States, Department of State, Records ef the Department
of State Relating to Political delations Between the United S tates and
llexlco 1910-1929 ( YJashington, 1960), 711.12/515a, Hughes to Consul

Wood, December 15, 1923.
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December 6 at Veracruz that they could
safely pay thelr roBttIB8 dutleg
te the rebels and that they could load
and unload shipments at the

port, notwithstanding an order by Obregon to
the eontrary. 63

At this

time nothing was mentioned about paying the
duties under protest as

would be done with an illegal government.

After December 23, the

State Department would not agree to any action by one
of its agents
(Wood or any ether consul) which was contrary to
an executive order

issued by Obregon.

in relation to arms requests by the rebels,
Hughes

simply told do la Huerta on December 21 that it would not be
advisable
to answer to answer his request at this time. 64

This reply did not

eliminate the chance that the rebels would be able to eh tain arms from
the United States Government in the future.

However, a request by the

Obregon Government on December 15 for the sale of two discarded American

naval cruisers was refused because of the provisions of Article 18 of
the lreaty of the Limitation of Eaval Armaments signed at V&shington. 65

After this reply, the Obregon government must have been somewhat suspicious of our intentions as Obregon told his Foreign Office to be
alert to protest against any American assistance or participation in
the rebel movement."

In conclusion, It

^as Impossible to forecast

with any accuracy what the American government would do if Hughes's

Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26533, Consul
Secretary of State, December 6, 1923.
64

lbid .

.

i/ood

to the

812.00/26647, nughes to Consul food, i>ecember 21, 1923.

65

For complete details ef the treaty see gorgign Halations . 1923
(Washington, 1938), II, 567-68.
66

lnternal Affairs of Mexiee . 812.00/26727, afuramorlia to Hughes,
December 22, 1923.
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"basic supposition that Obregon would win a quick victory
proved in-

oorreot.

If ovents changed the State Department would have to reap-

praise its position of watchful waiting.

Daring the first three weeks of the revolt events transpired

which brought a change in the American position.

First of all, Hughes's

supposition about the revolt proved completely unfounded as the month
•f December progressed.

The revolt which began in Veracruz quickly

spread to other parts of the country bocause an increasing number of

generals in the army defected.

feur other states in revolt.

battle array.

67

On December 7, 1923, there were already
Array units joined the rebels in full

Most ef the strategic Mexican Gulf perts fell into the

hands of the rebels when the Gulf fleet deserted* 68

Although the

Government managed to retain the Pacific ports throughout the rebellion,

Another serious blew

the ports needed for importing arras had fallen.

was inflicted when the two major oil producing areas, Tuxpam and Tameq

pico, were captured by the rebels.

The Government's chief source of

revenue had been cut off and it would be very difficult indeed to take
care of normal governmental obligations, such as paying the army and
The Federal troops had accomplished little, at least

the foreign debt.

not enough to offset the debilitating losses.

JJy

Christmas Day,

Cuemavaca, only forty miles from Mexico City, had fallen in a rebel

6 7 Now

York Times . December 7, 1923, p.

6 8 Intemal

5.

Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26727, Summerlin to Hughes,

December 22, 1923.
69

Naw York Time s . December 30, 1923, p. 15.
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offensive.

By the end of Decombor Obrogon was in serious
trouble as

ho controlled only the inwediato area around Mexico City and
the barron

north.

Calculations by our Consul in Veracruz, Jehn Wood, showed that

the rebols controlled ten states and the (iovornment eight, while the

rebels held sevonteen ports and the Government had only ten. 71

Thus,

by the end of December not only was the revolt not localized but there
wan a distinct threat that the rebellion might become a long drawn out
s

truckle*

Moreover, Obreeon was in serious dancer of beinff overthrown

a s the now year dawned*

Another significant factor was the advers* effect that the revolution had on American businessmen operating in Mexico*

Revolution

brought in its wako disorder and chaos which upset transportation
scheduler

and production timetables*

Kebol movements had cut off sup-

plies to Mexico City and some factories were forced to close down their

operations because of the lack of raw materials*
true in the case of the weaving mills. 7 ^

'iliis

was especially

In addition, when rebel

forces occupied the oil fields a drastic reduction in oil production
ensued*
The State Department was not likely to overlook protests such as

those made by the Narragansett and

*Jew

England Power Fuel Companies

which were critically short of the oil necessary to produce licht and

7Q

Now York Times . .December 24 f 1923. p. !•

7 1 Internal

Affairs of Moxico . Consul

"food to the

State, January 4, 1924.
72
ITew

York Times . January

6

f

1923, p* 3*

Secretary of
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power in Hhode Island. 73

*<ven the

attitude of H.

IT.

Branch of the

Huasteca Petroleum Company changed from one of open
opposition te the
Obregon' Government to a belief that Obregon should
be aided by the

United States if it was necessary to insure stability. 74

Hughes com-

mented that the United States needed the exportation of oil from Tam-

pioo unhampered. 75

The Hew York Times stated earlier in the month

that "so long as the Mexicans keep the row to themselves and do not
interfere with the persons or properties of American citizens, the

government will, according to reliable reports, maintain the attitude
of a neutral observer.

However, since rebel activities wore re-

sponsible for the disruption of business activities, this would negate
to a great extent the favorable reports of our diplomatic representa-

tives in Mexico with respect to do la Huerta and his followers.

Another event in December which changed the situation was due te
a shrewd move by Ubregon.

American diplomats in Mexico not only re-

ported their favorable impressions of de la rtuerta but they particularly
emphasized their opinions that it would be sheer madness on our part to
support Ubregon when it would mean the eventual election of the radical

Calles as his successor.
Obregon took steps in iiecember to blunt the impact of this argu-

ment.

The Mexican Government stopped supporting Calles and instead

73

Internal Affairs of Lkxico . 812.00/26795, Chase to Colt,
January 18, 1924.
74

Ibld .

.

812.00/26852, Sylie te Hanna, January 14, 1924.

7 5 Ibid .

.

812.00/26767, Hughes to Summerlin, January 15, 1924.

76 Rew York Times. December 16, 1923, Sec. V., p. 3.
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oalled for loyalty to the government. 77

Ualles discreetly was forcod

Into the background as he was not given a military
command until more

than two weeks after the revolt broke out despite the fact
that ho

applied for a battlefield commission when the revolt broke
out.

'ilhe

revolt now was not against the imposition of a radical, as characterized by our diplomats and the rebels, but it was an attempt to remove

a duly elected, constitutional government headed by Obrego'n.

Seen in

this light it would be difficult for the State Department to refuse to

aid an individual who had agreed to some important concessions at the
Bucareli Conference.

Moreover, Ualles tried to prove that the charges

levelled against him by our American consuls were false.

In speeches

made by Ualles in this period, one is impressed by their moderate tone

which is in stark contrast to his earlier statements.

Hot only did he

appeal to the middle class for support but he promised "strict compliance with all contractual obligations" and the observance of "method

and order" in the land reform program.

78

Also, he stated numerous

times that he would follow Cbregon's policies.

He did this not only to

attract the votes of Cbregon's admirers but also to dispel the belief
that he wag a radical,

in an obvious reference to the Bucareli Con-

ference, Calles stated that he would "comply vigorously with the legal

agreements which they (the Mexican Government) contract with other

77 Internal Affairs of Mexico. 812.00/26727, Sumraerlin to Hughes,
December 22, 1923.
78 P"hit.aroo Elias Calles. Moxioo Bofore the T7orld. Trans, by
R. H. Murray (New York, 1927), pp. 4-10.
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nations. «™

This tended to eliminate any deubt which may
have arisen

about Callers attitude toward tho Huoareli agreement
which was favorable te the United States,

fiie

Gevemment then had discounted the

claim that the revolt was justified because it was aimed at
removing a
radical threat to the country.

Olhis

no basic motive for its existence.

made the rebellion appear to have
In conclusion, this change in

Calles's behavior was responsible to a great degree for Hughes's
de-

cision to ignore the recommendations of our diplomatic corps in Mexico.

Another significant factor, which created serious concern in
V&shington circles and which led to the Araerioan decision to change its
policy, was the apparent split developing in the rebel ranks.

Ohere

were already indications in December that the rebels were splitting
into disgruntled factions.

Jf'or

instance, when General Aiaycetto re-

volted in Caxaca he denounced the titular head of the rebellion, de la
Huerta, and expressed his desire to establish a military triumvirate te

lead the revolt. 8 ^

Because of the character of the revolt, it was

quite likely that the ambitious men who were its leaders would continue
the struggle if Gbrege'n was deposed.

A letter from

U.

B.

Graves in-

dicated that this development was likely as he warned the State Depart-

ment thuslyi

"If the revolt should succeed, disorder will prevail for

a long time as a harmonious grouping of the successful ones
difficult as a campaign. w
79
80

Is about as

on

would mean mounting instability which

Ibld *. p. 12.

lntemal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26727, Summerlin to Hughes,

December 22, 1923.
81
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would probably last for a number of years and American
live* and property would be endangered* 8?

Other events occurred in Mexico which had a great
deal to do with
the American decision to intervene in the struggle
on the side of the

Obregon Government.

Of utmost importance here was the fate of the

General and Special Claims Convention signed at the Bucaroli
Conference.

Heoognition of Obregon was based on this but the agreement had to
be
ratified by the Mexican Senate.

Y&en Obregon presented both conventions

to the Senate in December for their consideration, the State
Department

must have been alarmed by the reception they received, especially from
tho de la Ifuerta faction in the Senate.

On December 20, 1923 tho

Huortistaa were very vociferous in their criticism of Article IX of tho

Claims Conventions which allowed Americans to be paid in cash instead
•f in bonds for their land which was confiscated for reasons of public
utility.

'ikus

it is possible that, despite tho favorable pronounce-

ments of de la Huerta, which made such an impression on men such as
Consul Wood, the State Department believod ho (de la Huerta) was behind
some sinister plot to destroy tho guarantees we received at the Bucaroli

Conference.

Moreover, de la Huerta whose revolt was inadequately fi-

nanced began the practice, obnoxious in American eyes, of requiring
that American firms in Mexico advance money to his movement

®^A lesson
possibility that
oxpoctod. After
ranza, Villa and
83

ITow

face tho

from the past taught that it was more than a distinct
if the revolt succeeded further difficulties could be
Huerta was deposed in 1914 by the triumvirate of CarZapata, the real pov/er struggle began.

York Times. December 21, 1923, p.

3.
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threat of reprisal. 84

Another adverse feature of the revolt in the
eyes

of the State Department was that the return of
the railreads (taken over

by the government during the Revolution from 1911 to
1920) to private
interests was postponed by Obregon in December, 1923 until
the rebels

should bo crushed. 85

Thus, do la Huerta appeared to be upsetting some

of the delicate negotiations which had been carried out by tho two

governments from 1921 to 1923.

inuring the same period, Obregon was

making a favorable impression on American officials with his attempts

to

carry through tho various agreements with the United States despite the
turbulence created by the rebellion.

The Hew Yerk Times commented j

...although it (Mexican Government) is at present called upon
to cope with insurgents, it has approved one of the claims conventions recently negotiated and has asserted its determination
promptly to approvo the other; and by the further fact that,
during the past few days, at a time when unusual demands are
being made on its revenues, it has completed a substantial deposit to carry out its agreement for refunding the Mexican debt.
Tho statements by our consuls in Mexico that our national interests

would be served by supporting tho rebellion did not appear to be justified by events during tho month of December*
There were definite signs near the end of 1928 which Indicated
that the Departments attitude had shifted away frem the earlier policy

of watchful waiting.

Hughes instructed our consuls at Veracruz and

Manzanilla, two of the rebel strongholds, to "discreetly investigate

and telegraph the Department if any shipments of war materials are

^Internal Affairs of Mexico. 812.00/26664, Summerlin

to Hughos,

December 24, 1923*
85 Ibio>, 812.00/27123, Summerlin to Hughes, Aiarch 8, 1924*
8 6 lT«w

Yerk Times. January

1, 1924, p. !•
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received "by the rebel forces.

A similar study was net made ef the

Government's source ef supplies.

This appeared te be a preliminary

step which could lead to further action if it was discovered
that the

rebels were obtaining arms from the United States.

Although no embargo

had been placed on the shipment of arms, the State Department by the
third week of December had prohibited the exportation of government

equipment into Mexioe.

Although private shipments of arms to the

rebels were not prohibited, the Mexican newspaper Excelsior considered
this to be an indication that Hughes thought the rebel movement wag
"illegal". 88

The real test would come, however, when both sides in tho

struggle would issue a request for tho purchase of weapons and ammunition from either the government or private sources in tho United States.
On Deoember 26, 1923 the Ubregon Government through its representative

in Vfeshingten,

'i'ellez,

made a request for

arras.

He wanted to know if

tho United States Government was willing to sell a number of rifles

that were in 3an Antonio, Texas.

89

Threo days later, in a secret con-

ference, Hughes gave i'ellez an affirmative reply to the request.

A de-

cisive factor which brought about this decision was an urgent dispatch
from Summerlin a few days before that stated "unless wo take some kind
ef moral intervention" matters will become worse*

90

87

Internal Affairs of l.lexlco . 812.00/26618a, Hughes to Consul Wood,
Deoomber 15, 1923, and 012.00/26S19a, Hughes to the Consul at iaanzanilla,
December 17, 1923.
8 8 Ibid »

.

812.00/26698, Summerlin to Hughes, December 22, 1923.

8 9 Forel^n Relations

.

1923 (Washington, 1938), II, 568.

Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26673^, Hanna to Hughes,
Summerlin Dispatch, December 23, 1923
9 0 Internal
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The decision to soli arms to the uoxioan
Government did not re-

main a secret for long as a leak occurred in
the State Department or,
even more likely, in the

57ar

Department.

On January 4 f 1924 Senator

Fairchlld demanded a full inquiry into the report
that arms were
secretly being sold to the government in Mexico and
he also wanted the

State Department to provide all the details of the
sale. 91

The State,

Department was being pressured into publioly admitting its
decision.
It would also have to provide reasons to justify its
position as the

decision would arouse opposition in Congress.

Any further attempt to

delay a public announcement was dismissed as de la Huerta decided to
test his rights by ordering 5,000 rifles, 3,000,000 rifle

and 100,000 round3 of machine gun ammunition. 92
attempt

)

ridgea

In de la

li.

clear the air of any doubts, he brought the full weight of

the United States Government to bear against his movement. On Janu-

ary 7, 1924 President Uoolidge announced the decision that would
ly affect the struggle In Mexico.

vital-

Utilizing the authority he was granted

under the provisions of a congressional act of January

31,

1922, which

superseded the proclamation of 1912, Coolidge placed an embargo on the

exportation of arms or munitions into Mexico.

munitions were permitted, with the approval of

Shipments of arms or
the

State Department, if

they were going to the Obrogon Government or if they were needed for
94.

industrial purposes.
91

92

93

50xis,arm8 could be sent to the Mexican Govorn-

!Tow

York Times . January 4, 1923, p.

3.

^Tew

*ork Times . Jamxary 6, 1924, p.

1

7/illiams,

_op_.

alt .

,

p.

148.

^'orqiffi Relations . 1924 ('.ihshington, 1939), II, p. 429.
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ment (except for ships) but any attempt to smuggle arms to the
rebels
would result in confiscation of the weapons, fines and imprisonment.

According to Hughes, we were*
...throwing our influence in an entirely correct manner in favor
of the development of constitutional government and against unwarrantable uprisings, in protecting the legitimate freedom of
commerce, we are making the greatest contribution directly within
our power, and in accord with our established traditions and
manifest interest, to the cause of world peace. 95

Despite such official pronouncements, it is important to note now what
our main reasons were for intervening in the struggle in xdexioe.
First of all, the Administration had to show critics that its

decision to sell arms to Obrego'n did not establish a shattering precedent and that it was legal in terms of international law.

teighes argued

that this action did not constitute Intervention per se but represented

what he termed to be "non-belligerent interposition." 96

Since there

were no recognized belligerents in an insurgency according to inter-

national law, the shipments would not conflict with any neutrality laws.
Interposition, a device discredited during our own Civil Y&r, was being

used by Hughes to aid a friendly government which was involved in a
domestic disturbance.

In explaining his interpretation of American

foreign policy, Hughes stated*

"In granting the request (for arms),

there was no question of intervention, no invasion of the sovereignty

•f Uexioo, as we were acting at its insistence and were exercising our
95

Hughes, The Pathway of Peace (Hew York, 1925), p. 101.

96

Charles Evans Hughes, Our Relations to the Hat ions of the
*'or an
81-82.
Vfe stern Hemisphere (Princeton, ilew Jersey, 1928), pp.
analysis of interposition see Dexter Perkins, Charles Evans Hughes
and American Democratic Statesmanship (Boston, 1956), pp. 135-36.

«
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undoubted right to sell arms to the existing government •* 97

(Thus,

Hughes contended that even though we had the rieht to intervene directly
in the struggle since there was n© recognized "belligerent, the United

States was simply interposing its will.

In ether words, direct inter-

vention, as practiced during the years ef "gunboat diplomacy", was "being
cast aside for the more sophisticated method of interposition.

retary ef

TCar

As Sec-

Weeks pointed out, sales such as this had ocourred before.

For example, Washington had sold 5100,000 of arms to Cuba and #170,000
to Nicaragua in 1919.

98

However, he failed to mention that no elaborate

policy of interposition was then drawn up to defend this action because
there were no critics of the sales.

Hughes saw another precedent for

this sale which was established just shortly after World ?&r
sold arms to six .European governments.

99

I

when we

Again there was a difference

in this case which was not mentioned as civil 3trife was not occurring
in these countries as was the case here in Mexico in 1923 and 1924.
The Administration defended its decision by proving that no

international agreement which the United States was a party to had been
broken.

For instance, Harding had not signed the Convention of 3t»

100
Germain which would have prevented the shipments.

The United States

was not a member ef any pact which restricted our course of action in

97 Hughes, The Pathway of Peace (New York, 1935), p. 100.
98 "A Sleight of Hand Deal in Mexico," Current Opinion . February,
1924, p. 144.

"United States, Congressional Kecord

,

68th Cong., 1st Sess.,

1924, LXV, Part 2, 1407.
l°Ofileanor Kyllys Allen, "The Case for American Aid to ubregon,"
74-75,
Current history leasing (N.w York Time si , April, 1934. pp.
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regard to the sale of anna in Latin America.

However, the decision to

sell arms ran into opposition because it conflicted with
the Harding

doctrine which was announced in April, 1923.

Harding expressly statedt

hopo it will be the policy of the .?ar Department to make no
sales of war equipment to any foreign power but that you will
go further and make certain that public sales to our own
citizens will be attended by proper guarantees that such supplies are not to be transferred to any foreign power. 10 *
I

:

Although this was not an international agreement it definitely appealed
to some segments of American society which favored a return to tho

isolationist policy of tho past.

Shis doctrine was never passed by

Congress and it was not presented as an executive order so, of course,
it had no legal force.

Thus, although the sale to ubregon represented

a definite departure from the Harding doctrine, Coolidge answered hit
critics by arguing that Harding* s decision was not binding en him as it

did not have the force of law.

10 **

Hughes added tha$ Harding's policy

"in no way precludes us from furnishing arms to aid in the putting down

•f insurrectionary attacks upon the public ordor in a neighboring state

whoso peaceful development is especially important to us."

103

Never-

theless, the Harding doctrine was extremely embarrassing to tho Admini-

stration when full scale debate opened in Congress in the first few

months of 1924*

However, regardless of the popularity of the Harding

doctrine in some quarters, Coolidge and Hughes were correct when they

10 1 New York Times . December 30, 1923, p. 15. Although never onacted it is always referred to as the Harding Doctrine by all contemporaries*

103

Hue)»«, Hi. Pathway »f P«ao» (K»w Y»rk, 1925), p. 100.
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argued that the dec trine had ne legal force and could not ho
considered
ae a restriction or limitation imposed on the freedom of action
of the

Administration.
The Administration then presented in clear, concise terms
the

reasons for the embargo.

As H&ghos explained!

is to aroid tho fomenting of revolution..." 104

"The object (of embargo)

This frank espousal of

our aim left ne room for doubt as to our true intentions.

Oho State

Department was in full agreement with the analysis of tho Mexican

newspaper £1 Universal which stated in an editorial entitled "The
Eternal Tragedy of the Presidential Succession* that "vielonce in any
form causes national retrogression." 105

The Administration was well

aware of the unfortunate course vdiich Mexican history had followed from
1911 to

""920

and they seemed prepared to do everything in their power

to prevent any repetition of such events.

Coolidgo stated in an ad-

dress to Congress on .February 11, 1924 that "after a long period of

shifting and what appeared to us to bo unsubstantial governments in
that country, we recently reached the opinion that President Obregon

has established a government which is stable and effective and disposed
106
to observe International obligations. .."

One cannot read the cor-

respondence of tho participants in tho American decision without being

emphatically aware of tho fact that "stability and orderly procedure"
104 Hughos, Our Relations (Princeton, New Jersey, 1928), p. 51.
10 5

£

Internal Affaira of Mexico . SI 2. 00/26 697, Summerlin to Hughes
gl Unlvorsal editorial] . December 21, 1923.

106

United States, Congressional Record , 69th Cong., 1st 3ess.,
1924, LXV, Part 3, 2338.

«
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_

_

were uppermost in the minds of American officials.

After nearly ten

years of constant disruption with the resultant
loss of life and destruction of property the State Department now let
it be known that
it would not remain inactive when civil strife
erupted again.

Hughes, at least, was impressod with ObrogoVs accomplishments
in

achieving stability and rebuilding business confidence despite the
fact that he labored under the handicap of non-recognition. 107

In

respect to Obregon*s request for arms which were needed to restore

peace, Uoolidge told the Republican Club ef New York on February
12,

1924
To refuse would have appeared to be equivalent to deciding

that a friendly Government, which we had recognized, ought
not to bo permitted to defend itself. Stated in another
way, it would mean that we had decided that it ought to be
overthrown, and that the very agency which we had held out
as able to protect the interests of our citizens within its
borders ought not to bo permitted to have the means to make
such protection effective. 108
Thus, the decision was made to reward Ubrego'n for bringing some sem-

blance of order and peace to Mexico.

On the other hand, any faction

which tried to upset constitutional procedure would receive only our
animosity as they threatened to make the situation unstable.

Qhis

would result in the loss of life and the loss of business confidence
which the American investor depended on to a large extent.

P-»ghes

used a cliche to describe what our main intention in Mexico was.

107

Hughes,

'ihe

Pathway of Peace (New fork, 1925), p. 98.

108
Allen, op. cit., p. 74.
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He saidt

"We are net aiming at control but
endeavoring te establish

self-control." 109
This was the main argument presented by the
Administration in

defense ef the embargo but ether subpeints related
to this main
thesis were prosented.

The nature of the revolt itself was very

instrumental in determining the eventual American position
in re-

gards te the revolt.

7

As Charge Summerlin pointed out that the "pre-

text (for the revolt) was the ualles candidature, but revolution

would have come if that pretext had not been provided. 110

Even

the flow York -ximes was puzzled as to the real motives of the rebels,

as it commented that "the history of the new movement is curious as
no great national issues are involved.. n111

Thus, any hopes that

the Huertistas would bo able to obtain arms in the United states

nearly completely disappeared when it appeared to nearly all the

policy makers concerned in the United States that the revolutionaries lacked any concrete reasons for their actions.

Since many

members ef the military were involved in the revolt, it must have

appeared te the State .Department to be an old-fashioned "cuartelaze"—
a blow struck from the garrison.

This latter device held no promise

for peace and stability in the future.

Moreever, the split that de-

veloped in the rebel camp made it evident that the "personal element
109 ifughe8, The Pathway of Peace (Hew York, 1925), p. 159.

11 0 Internal Afffairs ef Mexioo . 812.00/26868, Sumrnerlin te
Hughes, January 11, 1924.

mffew York

Times , December 7, 1923, p. 1.
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in the Revolution was everything. "

n2

Thus, if the rebels wsn de-

struction and disorder were likely to
continue with its disastrous

effeots on business.

<ihe

United States Governmont was net likely
to

watch the vital raw materials interrupted
and

Wican

businessmen

harrassed due to a series of "family quarrels"
within the revolutionary group
Instability brought other problems in its wake as well
which

led to our decision.

A basic assumption of our State Department had

been that, according

to international law, our govornment is respon-

sible for the protection of the property and the lives of
its na-

tionals abroad and thus, any throat of injury to our nationals was a

proper matter for our concern.

Because of the revolt American lives

were being lost, several Americans were killed whon rebels wreckod a
train near Celaya. 114

In addition, such rebel tactics as forced

leans and destruction of the transportation system of the country
led Hughes to believe that the rebels were attempting to "obstruct
"I "I

C

and destroy" American commerce*

Such intolerable conditions

could not be allowed to continue if the government was properly to
fulfill its role.

Hughes intimated as much when he saidt

"tfe

thus

have the difficulty that the instability of governments creates a
112S. J. Dillon,
"The Inside Pacts of the Mexican Revolution,"
Current History Magazine (New York Times), July, 1924, p. 536.
113 Simpson, op. oit .

,

p.

88.

11 4 Now York Times December, 1923, p. 35.
,

115Hughes, Our Relations (Princeton, Now Jersey, 1928), p. 52.
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hazard which private capital (and the State
Department) refuses te
ignore..."

116

Thus, the State Department, if it was te
perferm its

mission adequately ef protecting American lives and
property, had te
premete stability.

In the past, the United States had employed

cruder metheds te insure stability in Hispanic America such as
dis-

patching warships te the scene er the landing ef marines.

However,

a mere subtle approach was possible here as all that was mainly

needed new was an extensive aid program te Obregon which would insure

his eventual victery.

Obregon had proved himself capable of main-

taining order in the past,

Thus, an adequate amount of Amorican

ammunition and guns would enable him te stabilize the situation again
without the necessity of the United States getting directly involved
in the

c

.nation.

Finally, State Department officials suggested the possibility
that if we did not interpose our will serious complications might

develop which might involve us in a more delicate situation later en.

Hughes was not about te abandon the Hoosevelt corollary to the Monroe

Doctrine as he warned that "formal abandonment (of intervention)

might be an invitation to new controversies er might prompt or excuse
action which otherwise would net have been contemplated."
controversies might arise were net mentioned by Hughes.

117

What new

furthermore

it was intimated that if we did net interpose our will a European

116

Hughes f The Pathway of Peace (New fork, 1925), p. 136.

117Hughes, Our Relations (Princeton, aew Jersey, 1928), p. 15.
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power might intervene as it was

••Wllary

nr

duty because ef the Roosevelt

to the Monro* Doctrine to maintain
ordor in Hiepanie

Anerica, 118

i'oroign governments would have to aot in
"behalf of

their citizens in Mexico to protect them if the American
Government
failed to take any action,

ianis,

action en our part had now become

mandatory if order was to he restored. 119

118Perkins, op*
clt '» PP» 131-35.
119

^Cftes, Our Relations (Princeton,

i\!ew

Jersey, 1928), p. 19.

CHAPTER V

IMPLEMENTATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
la Jala annual report f»r the fiscal
year, 1924, Secretary ef

*r

Weeks deelaredt

«... there were supervised bills
presented fer

surplus property sold In the United States te
foreign governments,

principally te the Government of Mexico, to the amount ef
$965,069.74.
Sales to the Cuban and Mexican Governments amounted
to $1,606,145 .92."120

As far as can be determined, the only request of Obregen
that was
refused was his need for nayal vessels which has already been
mentioned.

Most of the nearly $1,000,000 in arms which were provided

were bought on credit as the Mexican Government was unable to pay
cash.

The first shipment which included 500,000 rounds of ammunition

and 900 rifles was made on jOeoomber 23, 1923. 121

'i&is

is the ship-

ment te Mexico which prompted the Congressional inquiry which will
be examined later.

As nearly as can be calculated, the total ship-

ment up te March 13, 1924, which for all purposes can be considered
the end of the rebellion, amounted te 20,000 rifles, 5,000,000

rounds ef ammunition, 11 airplanes (mostly of the do Haviland type),
33 machine guns, and 2,900 bombs.

122

*kat of the equipment was

120

United States, Department of War. Annual Report ef the
Secretary of '.var. 1924. n. 169.
121 New York Times. December
24. 1923. d. 2.
122 New York Times. March 13. 1924.
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distributed to the labor and agrarian
batallions which rallied to
the cause of the Federal GoYornmont.

Also, stringent measures were taken to
make sure that the

rebels would not receive similar equipment.

Justice Department

agents patrolled the Mexican border to prevent any
smuggling.
Their funotion was supplemented by the activities of
American
workers.

On December 21, 1923 Gorapers, President of the
American

Federation of Labor, who supported Calles and Obregon, asked
the

labor unions in the United States which were engaged in transpert

work "to assist the United States Government in the detection of
gun running and smuggling of illicit supplies to the forces of the

rebellion..." 123

Their efforts wore fruitful as they net only dis-

covered contraband headed for the rebels but they also had the effect
of discouraging additional shipments which would result in the con-

fiscation of all the goods. 124

Since most of the northern part of

Mexico was in the hands of the Government, the likeliest place fer
the rebels to receive guns was from New Orleans as they controlled

the Gulf ports in Mexico.

Do la Huerta's agents in New Orleans

were kept under close surveillance and arrests were made by the
United States District Attorney in the port. 125

This was a disas-

trous blow for the rebels as their foe was gaining strength with
l23 Rowland

Hill Harvey, Samuel Gempersi Champion of the
Tollinr Masses (Stanford Univ., Calif., 1935), pp. 190-93.
l24 For do tails see Internal Affairs of Mexico
Surarnerlin to Hughes, January 12, 1924*
12 5 Hew York -rimes , itocember 22, 1923, p» 4»

*

812»00/26821
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eub.tantlal shipments from the United
Stat.. Governmont, while they

were being denied the opportunity to
gain access to munition* In
the Unltod States,

fly

the end of January the .ffoct of
this had

become evident and tho tide had begun
to turn.
Other measures wore also taken in January
which substantially

aided Obregen»s cause.

In the interests ef protecting American

citizens, we demanded that de la Huerta suspend his
order to blockade
Tampioo and Hughes backed up this demand by
dispatching the cruiser,
u# s#

s » Richmond, to the scene.

Heedless to say, the three renel

gunboats which maintained the blockade quickly melted away when
the
Richmond, reached the scene.

Eae rebels had picked one of tho worse

porta to blockade as this brought about a drop in oil production and
oxpertat*

4.

Although the rebels did manage to capture Tampice with-

out the blockade, the failure to cut off supplies did mean a delay in

their plane, especially in relation to control ef the customs houses
in the port.

In another similar action, we forced the rebels to re-

move their mines at the ports of Frontera, Puerto Mexico and Veracruz

by issuing a "solemn warning" to tho rebels. 127

ir

h«y tried to bar-

gain with Hughes by requesting that the Bravo . a Federal gunboat, bo
Interned in Wew Orleans by American authorities.^- 2 ®

ihe requost was

126 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26763, Hughes to Consul
Wood, January 19, 1924.
12 7 Ibid »

.

12 ff Ibid .

.

812.00/26788, Hughes to American Enbassy in Mexico
City, January 21, 1924.

812.00/26799, Consul Wood to Hughes, January 19, 1924
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denied and the Bray* did finally gall for Mexioe
on February 9,
1924. 129

Typical of the double gtandard employed by
Hughes threugh-

eut the struggle was his reaction to the news
that the Federal

eorernment had rained the port of Salina Cruz.

Although Hughes

warned Obregon of "the grave effeots en American sympathies" if
an
American vessel was hit by a mine, he did not demand that they be
removed as long as they were within the three-mile limit. 130

Thus,

while Obregon could run supplies into a beleaguered garrison, the
rebels, if they wore surrounded, would be taking a calculated risk
in reinforcing their troops if their only approach was by sea.

Finally, the United States also aided Obregon by allowing 2,000

Mexioan troops to pass through nineteen miles ef eur territory in
the El Pase area, to facilitate a government offensive.

131

Although

there were precedents for such action, it was definitely generous ef

us to grant such permission which resulted in a Federal victery.
Cur aid was of such importance that it played a substantial

part in altering the outcome of the struggle.

Our assistance, as

described above, was either indirect or resulted from protests en
the part ef eur government.

answered.

However, a major question remains un-

the United States directly intervene in the struggle

i)id

by deploying special troops to Mexico?

As was already mentioned,

12 9 Ibid .

.

812.00/27012, Summerlin to Hughes, February 9, 1924.

13 °Ibld .

.

812.00/26803, Hughes to American Embassy in Moxiee

City, oanuary 23, 1924.
13l Foreign Rolations, 1924 (Jfoshington, 19391, II, 431.

55

Clin, charged that seventeen United
States planes bombed the de la

Huerta revolutionaries in Jalisco.

A clarlf icatien 1. needed b.fere

examining the validity of the charge.

i<he

United States Government

did supply eleven planes but Cline inferred
that uoelidge alse sup-

plied the pilots.

It is the latter charge which must
be examined.

It should be made clear that American
pilots were operating in

Mexico on both sides.

j)e

la Huerta agents did attempt to enlist

five American aviators in New Orleans and they
apparently were sue*

cessful. 132

They appeared to be suocesful because, despite the fact

that the Mexican Army Air Corps remained loyal to Ubregen,
renel

aircraft were active in the early part ©f the campaign and it may
be

assumed that aliens were manning the craft.

Rebel aircraft broke

the Federal blockade at Manzanilla by forcing the gunboat Progresso
to surrender on January 5, 1924. 133

Definite evidence exists that

at least two American pilots, Charles Mayse and H. L. Andrews, were

members of the Mexican Army as they were discharged from the army by
Obregen on May 13, 1924. 134

The aircraft of the federal Government

also played a decisive role in the rebellion, especially at the
battle of Jimenez.

135

2h» main point is that these pilots were not

l3 2 Internal Affairs
of Mexico T 812.133/9400, Burns to Hanna,
January 5, 1924.
13 3 Ibid .

.

812.00/26919, Consul Aguirre to the Secretary of

State, January 2, 1924.
134 Ibid .

.

812.00/2714, Consul AicEnelly to tho Secretary of

State, ilarch 13, 1924.
l3 5 Ibid

. .

812.00/26970, Consul MoEnelly to the Secretary of

State, January 31, 1924.
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members ef the United States Army Air Corps as inferred by Cline.
This can be substantiated by the fact that the Secretary ef \&r re-

perted te the President that frem June 30, 1923 te June 30 1924
f
Inclusive, only one American enlisted man died in Alexice and he was

absent without leave from his post in the United States. 136

In

addition, there is no record of any United 3tates troops in Mexico
in this period.

137

American pilots who were in Mexico then,

were net members of our armed forces but simply can be classed as
adventurers.

For any ef a number ef reasons they slipped across the

border and applied for service with either the Government ef the
rebels.

Thus, pilots of our government did not fly these planes at

Jalisco and there is no concrete evidence that there were more than
two and net seventeen American adventurers in the Mexican army*

Another question immediately arises.

Did American officials

cooperate as Cline believes, by allowing these "soldiers of fortune*1
te slip across the border?

It is possible, of course, that this was

the beginning of a modern day practice, whereby a "volunteer 11 army

was sent to a troubled area under the official auspices ef the
government.

This charge lacks validity if one examines

ttiffhes

f

s

reaction to the news that Americans were involved in the fieht ing»
Hughes informed Summerlint

"The Department fears that the activities

ef these Americans (Mayse and Andrews) may result in the occurence

l36United States, Department of
Secretary of Vfetr . 1924, p. 136.
Ibid .

.

p. 130.

Tfer,

Annual Benort of the
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ef seme rtertttaoU incidents involving
serious oinse^no.s and be-

lieves that appropriate authorities (Obregon)
should take strp. to
terminate their services with the Mexican Army," 138

An incident,

which could occur if an American piloted plane
killed Mexican women
and children in an air attack, would mean increased
anti-American
fooling.

Mere importantly. Hushes accurately predicted
that the

rebels would take advantage of this in their propaganda
when the

news became known,

(ike

great fear, of course, was that this in-

formation (American pilots killing Mexicans) would lead to
reprisals
against innocent American citizens who were conducting legitimate

business transactions in Mexioo, especially in Parral and Jimenez. 139
Due to the fact that Mayse was also supplying planes to Obregon,

United S

officials considered this to bo a violation of the

.tes

embargo, as State Department approval had not boon given, and Attor-

ney General Daugherty promised to prosecute Mayse when he was apprehended.

140

finally, in the last weok of February, Sumraerlin Informed

the Mexican Foreign Office that the United States wanted the two

Americans officially dischargod from service in the Mexican

Array. 141

They were net dischargod until May 13, 1924 because the Mexican

Government was reluctant to dismiss them as they were valuable not
l3 8

Internal Affairs of Mexico
February 12, 1924.
l3 9 Ibld

..

.

812.00/26970, Hughes to Sumraerlin,

812.00/26970, Consul McEnelly to the Secretary of

State, January 31, 1924.
14 0 Ibid

. .

14 1 Ibid .

.

812.00/27040, J>aughterty to Hughes, February 23, 1924
812.00/27055, Sumraerlin to Hughes, February 21, 1924.
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•illy ag

pilots but also because of tht planes that
they supplied.

However, this cannot be considered as cooperation
on the part of the

United States government.

Hughes was entirely consistent here as he

was mainly interested in protecting American
citizens in Mexico and
the activities of these two Americans could only
have endangered all

ether Americans in the country by creating seme regrettable
incident.
Lastly, one must consider why Oline made this statement.

Gline

did net try to distort the picture, even though his Inferonce was incorrect.

His basic mistake was caused by accepting an unreliable

source as concrete evidence, namely, the propaganda issued by the

rebels as the rebellion was coming to an end.

As possible victory

turned to defeat, tke rebels wore willing to grasp any straw or to
take advantage of any issuo to change what had beoemo inevitable by
the end of #tobruary.

In the rebel newspaper Rovoluoioq a charge was

made by General Salvador Abrarade, after his defeat at Guadalajara
H . ..he (Obregon) has employed foreigners to
pilot his

which statedt

aeroplanes to assassinate Mexioans upon their own soil." 142

Cline*s

statement follev/ed this charge as Guadalajara is tho capital of the
state of Jalisco.

It was propaganda as can be seen by the inclusion

of the word "assassinate."

Do la Huorta continued in the same vein

as he saidt
It matters net that Obregon hires North American pilots to
man the air ships and to carry murder and death to old people.

14 2 Ibid .

.

812.00/27104, Consul Aguirre to the Secretary of

State, February 15, 1924.
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^terminate the breed of

Again it was an attempt to capitals
on the latest anti-American
feeling in the country and to embarrass
Obregon.

By pointing to the

United States as the true enemy, do la Huerta
tried to discredit
Obregon by charging that he had sold out his
country to its powerful

northern neighbor.

This is the only evidence that can be
uncovered

which substantiates Clint's inference of direct
intervention by the

American government.

Of course, his reference to the fact that
arms

were supplied to Obregon was entirely correct.

However, at best,

propaganda such as this is useful to the historian only as an
indication of the plight that the rebels were in.

Propaganda, with its

distorted message, cannot be considered as concrete evidence to support such a supposition.
Thr

jeginning of the end occurred at the battle of Esperanza

en January 29, 1924 when Sanchez 1 , forces were routed, leaving behind

2500 dead and 1500 prisoners. 144

V/ith one

of the chief instigators

of the revel t removed from the scene it was only a matter of timo.

A few days later, do la Huerta was forced
at Veracruz. 14 ^

to evacuate his headquarters

This was the beginning of a long trok for him as he

14 3 Ibid .. 812.00/27042, Costolle to Coolidge,
February 27, 1924.
14 4 New York Times . February
7, 1924, p. 16.

14 5 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26940, Consul Sood to
Hughes, February 5, 1924.
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moved from port to port.

The campaign in tho west was Just as de-

oisiTO as General JSstrada saw his army crushed
at Ootelan. 146

Finally, en the 20th of iAarch do la Huerta
departed for the United
States on tho gunboat Zara^oza to begin nearly
twenty years in exile
as a piano teacher in California.
In summary, the reasons for the success of Obrogon
are quite

OTidont.

One factor was American aid which enabled Obrogon to
un-

leash an offensive after being on the defensive for the first month
of tho war.

Oho rebels were threatening to isolate completely Mexico

City until tho United States decided to supply Obregon's labor and

agrarian batallions with the necessary firepower needed to overcome
tho defections in the army.

From that point on Federal troops not

only blunted the rebel offensive but slowly and inexorably took over
the initiative,

©ras, American aid was one of the decisive factors

which enabled Obregon to repulse de la Huerta' s forces.

147

Other

factors also were involved in tho defeat of tho rebels but these were

not as important as American aid which brought tho dramatic change

which occurred in January.

For instance, the "cult of personalism"

which had been one of the major causes of the revolt was also a factor
which was responsible for its outcome.

At the first sign of impending

defeat, the heterogeneous group of rebels broke into complete disarray.

Constant quarrels which erupted among tho gonerals prevented

14 6 Ibld .

.

812.00/26983, Suramerlin to ttughes, February 11, 1924.

147 Gruoning,

oj>.

cit .

,

p.
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any cohosiYe plan from being formulated.

Finally, a great deal ef

credit must be giren te Obrcge'n who not
only strengthened the morale

•f his troops despite rererses but he also
preyed to he an excellent

military strate ff ist, especially at the
beginning ef the rebellion as
he concentrated his troops around the capital
until the ware ef de-

fections in the army ran its course.

*

CHAPTER VI

DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE AMERICAN DEC 13 ION"
It Is time to examine the reactions of
various segments »f

American society to the State Department decision
to aid Obrego'n.
This is necessary in a democratic environment
as foreign policy 1*

most instances is influenced by the Initial response
of various
interest croups.

In the case of the decision to aid Obregon, the

reaction of different croups in our society, especially Congress,
was instrumental in forcing the Administration

to

reasons for intervening indirectly In the dispute*

explain its
Except for the

"brief and terse announcement of January 7, 1924 by Coolidge,
there

seemed to be no disposition en the part of th© State Department to

discuss the matter further.

However, when the debate in Congress

began Hughes and Coolidge were forced to elaborate and issued a
series of major policy statements.

Thus, the Administration was

compelled to fully explain its decision.

There is ne evidence that

any -form of American aid was delayed (except possibly for the bombs)
or cancelled because of the domestic reaction but there is no doubt
that the Administration was concerned enough to schedule a series of

speeches by the highest government officials.

Lastly, it must be

seen if the public was porcoptive enough to see what was happening,
namely, the supplying of weapons to the established government in
order to try and maintain the status quo in the world by crushing
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any threat to the established order.
First of all, the reaction of the
press, which helps to for-

mulate American opinion, must he sorutinized
if one is able to understand the initial responses to Coolidge's
decision of January 7,
1924.

During the election campaign which preceded
the revolt,

American editorial opinion, as sampled by the
Literary Mmmmt,
sympathy divided between de la Haerta and Callos. 148
the revolt began

ajid Obrege'n

However, after

forced Calles into the background, most

American newspapers deplored the use of violence and
stressed the
importance of orderly succession,

tfer

example, the Spring-field,

Republican commented that the revolution in Mexico "is a depressing
reminder that the development of self-disciplined, orderly and
henest democracy is a painfully slow process." 149
same vein the New York Eveniner Pest saidi

Continuing in the

"Wh»n a ifo*-4M« •«m*«rf»«T

for the Presidency throws his sombrero into the ring, a machine gun
goes wit

it." 150

'ihe

American press was unanimous (no dissenting

voice could be found) in condemning what the Literary Digest tenrad
the "Unpepular Evolution. " 151

As a result when Coolidgo announced

his decision to support the Mexican Government most newspapers and
Journalists applauded the decision to sell arms to restore order*
148

"Causes Behind the Mexican Revolt," Literary Digest,
December 22, 1923, p. 11*
149

Springfield Republican, December a, 1923, p. 3»

150 "Causes Behind the Mexican Revolt," Literary Digest,
December 22, 1923, p* 11*
151«*iiaxico*s Unuouular Revolution." Literary Direst. January 5.
1924, p. 17,
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In an article f.r the Kew York
Times, Prank Behn concluded that
a

"new reTolutienary government would
brin C counter-revolution so
there would be a ciril war for a lon
C time" and thus, we would only
hare to Intervene later.152
£ditoriallyf
uew York Tim , r# _

^

fluoted the Administration's yiewpeint
the sale.

It said*

"ffe

fl

reading

the necessity of

must prevent revolutions, or nip them In

the hud, so as to save ourselves the awkwardness
of having to deal

with one officially, If it became successful." 153

One newspaper

favored even a stronger policy, namely, direct
intervention as the
Chlea ^c Tribune suggested that American troops
bo sent to Mexico to

"plattify" the country. 154
There were some critics of our policy who objected ts
the arms
sales mainly on the basis that it might have the epposite
effect

from that which was desired.

As the New York Times pointed out

"oven if the interests are wise," there are 'numerous risks." 155
In a letter to the editor, Jehn Kelly statedt

"The cne thing that

the Mexican people will not tolerate is foreign interference in their

152
"c

Frank Bohn, "President Coolldge and the Mexican Crisis,"
New York Times. Decoraber 20, 1923, p. 14. See also George Creel,
"And So We Meddle in Mexico." Colliers , February 2, 1924, p. 5.
15 s New York Times . January
2, 1924, p. 16.

154Uni ted States, IMpartment of State, Records of
the Depart
ment of State Relating to Political Relations Between the United
States andJJexlco 1910-19^9 Ofeshington, I960), 711.12, Summerlin
to Hughes [iinclosuro !To. Ij
f January 2, 1924
155

New York Times, December 31, 1923, p» 12*

1
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domestic problems.

In upholding Cbrego'n they have ruined
him.* 156

Evidently this unknown writer remembered: the
events of 1914 and 1916

whon the entrance of American troops onto
Mexican soil outraged the

Sloans

and they were almost unanimous in their disapproval
of our

action*
It must be seen if the newspapers were aware of
the change

which took place in our Latin American policy.

It is of importance

to note if American newspapers considered the State
Department's new

policy to be a dangerous precedent which would involve us in future
difficulties.

First of all, there can be ne doubt that most American

newspapers realized a shift had occurred in our policy,

.ttyen

a

strong supporter of the administrations decision to sell, George
Creel

(a

propagandist for Obregon), admitted the action was noyel

except for a sale by Lincoln some sixty years before.

However, he

dismissed such criticism with the observation that the "United
States will always meddle because it can't help it." 157

Sot all

contemporaries were able to dismiss Ooelidge's decision so easily.

Even near the end of the revolt, the Hew York Times stated that
Coolidge's "action may cause a troublesome precedent, but it's for
democratic, orderly government. "

158

However, despite the fear of

trouble because of this new policy, most American newspapers, while

applauding the decision to keep ubregon in power, offered no conii

ii
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156
"New York Times . January 1, 1924, p. 22.

•'"'

157 George creel, "And So We Meddle in Mexico." Colliers .
February 2, 1924, p. 5.
15 9Now York Times . February 14, 1924, p. 16.
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•tntttlTt alt. mative t. the
Administration' 8 decision

f

sell

arms^

exporting th. goal of stabilization,
no oth.r acceptable proposal was

. ffered ti

^&lf

reach the

^^

what tho future might hold whon
it commented,

Now Yefk

^

"Still doopor will bt

th. confusion if wo undertake to
docido not only what is law in
this

homisphoro but what is order.

Our now policy doesn't l.oturo
on good

government but docidos which is pure
government and will cans, now
anim.sitios against us.»l6°
this warning which was largely

^if

ignored as no major segment of society
took up the hue and cry, the
Hew York Times itself was mainly responsible
for its ineffeotualnos.
as most of its editorials dwelt on th.
success of American policy and
not with the real meaning or long range
effects of tho now policy.

Even though tho New York

Times,

warning failed to arouse criticism,

at least the attempt was made to explain the
effects of our policy.
Other interest groups wore vitally coneorned about
the course

of American policy vis-a-vis Mexico as well.

One of tho most

Tociferous supporters of tho administration was Samuel Gompers
of
th. American federation of Labor.

First of all, on December 11

Gompers praised the Mexican Federation of Labor for supporting

President Obrogon. 161

He then directed a concerted campaign to

convince Secretary of Stato Hughes to put a stop to the sale of
159

"Causes Behind the Mexican Revolt. » Literary Dip-eat .
Decembor 22, 1923, pp. 10-11.
16 0

New York Times . January

2, 1924, p.

16.

161 »Sllliam JSnglish filing, Ike Mexican
Question (New York,

1927), p. 90.

67

BWaitLM

t. d. la Huerta. 162

Of course, when the Administration

decision of January seventh wag
announced Gcmpers wag jubilant.
Hig roagong fer supporting ubregoli
are not so obvious as ubregon

and titxlean labor were not on the
friendliest of terms for a number
of reasons. 163

However, after the initial struggle in
the C. H.

0. M.

between the do la Huerta faction and Obregon»s
sympathizers, the
C. H.

0.

decision,

II.

decided to support Obregon and tempers accepted
thetr
-inhere

is evidence provided by Gempers himself
that he be-

lieved do la Huerta had numerous personality defects which
he had

discovered in his meetings with him and thus, he must have
welcomed
the C. R. 0. M. decision. 164

Adding further impetus to Gomper's de-

cigion to gupport Ubrego'n and the Ooolidge Administration, was hia

evident belief that the delicate negotiations between American and

Mexioan labor leaders which had resulted in the establishment of the
"Labor Monroe uectrine" in the autumn of 1923, which was beneficial
to the

/•

^rican federation of Labor, would be rescinded if do la

Huerta was successful. 165

If Gempers needed any further evidence to

cenvlnoe him that he chose the right course of action, it was not

long in coming as Huerta issued an anti-labor decree en December 24

162 Harvey, op. £it.

,

p. 327.

163 For additional information see Clark,

op_.

olt .

,

pp. 99-105.

164Sarauel Gorapers, Seventy
Years of Life and Labor (New York,
1925), II, PP. 319-20.

165Harvey,

_op.

olt .

,

pp. 326-27.

.
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i\ V

In Merida which established harsh
penalties fer labor unions. 166
Thus, the enly major interest group
in the United States which

persistently and actively took a position in
regard to the revolt
in Mexico was a strong supporter of
the administration's decision
to sell arras to Obregon while denying
the same to the rebel s.

Other interest croups, although less persistent
than the

American federation of Labor also expressed their
opinions about the
sale of American equipment to the Mexican Government,

'ike

most

serious opposition to the sale outside of Congress arose when
the

General staff expressed its disapproval of the sale, 167

Evidently

the army was fearful that these weapons might be used against
our

•

troops if we were forced to intervene direetly in the struggle as

was the case in 1914 and 1916.

ihis source ef opposition grow more

•erious when the generals convinced Secretary of Har Weeks that

their position in regard to the sale wag correct.

'iJhis

development

threatened to split the administration and produce a bitter struggle

which would delay the sale of the military equipment.

However,

after conferring with Hughes, Weeks was convinced that the sale was
necesaary and ne longer did he persist in defending the army'g
position.

168

The generals' epposition continued even though their

civilian superior changed his mind.

166Hew York Times. January 14. 1924. d. 5.
167irew

York Times. December 30. 1923.

r>.

170 Uew York Times. January 1. 1924. p. 2.

15.
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criticism was

eff„ t by an

presidents, namely, the border states.

old arch enemy .f most Mexican
<*» border states .f the

United states were mainly interested
in stability in Mexico as ohaee
and cenfusien eften meant possible raids
from south of the border to

antagonize the United States as happened in
1916 and 1918.

Thus,

the border states favored the Mexican arms
sales as they saw the

choice as either support of Obregon or anarchy. 169

Steps were taken

by such mon as Governor Hunt of Arizona to aid the
administration by
intercepting any aid or assistance which was rendered
to the Mexican
170 Finally,
other interest groups in Arizona, such as
rebels.

American business, although not expressing approval or disapproval
of
the sale, let their sympathies be known by their constant
reference
to the need for stability,

silence of other groups during the

'ihe

debate ever the arms sale can bo interpreted as a sign of approval
for the administration's action.
The most sorious opposition to the sale originated in congress.

Recognizing the fact that the President had the power to declare exceptions to the embargo under the provisions of the 1922 act, Congress could not challenge the constitutionality of his action.

However, despite the precedents and the use of the 1912 reselution
in the past, congressmen maintained that Coolidge had reversed the

policy of his predecessor, V/arren

G.

Harding.

The critics of the

sale decided that the best course of action was to try and enact the

169

Kew York Times . January 13, 1924, Sec VII, p. 13.

170812» 00/26694, eg. clt .

.

Hughos to Sunraerlin, December 21,1923.

,
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"Harding Doctrine"

Ut.

law.

As a result Mr. B.binsen
introduced

Dill 1819 In the Senate .n
January 8, 1924, a bill which
would hay*
prevented "the 8 ale of arms or
munitions to foreign governments and
to foreign military or
political authorities by tho United
Statu
and any eitisen or corporation
thereof." 171

Action was delayed until

this time (nine days after the sale)
because Confess had Just re-

convened.

At the same time Representatire
Fairchild introduced a

resolution in the House "directing the Secretary
of State to inform
the House, if not incompatible with the
public interest, certain in-

formation regarding the sale to Mexico of
certain war materials." 178
Of course, the inquiry never even started
as Hughes felt it was net
in the national interest to divulge information
which might arouse

anti-American feeling in Mexico,

The Senate bill which was the best

hope of the critics of the administration received support from

various quarters as Representatives Gardner of Texas and Cellar
of

New York and Senators Johnson of California and Jonos of New Mexico
favored enactment of the Harding doctrine,

iheir basic argument as

expressed by Cellar ran thuslyi
In conclusion, if the Obregen Government is strong it would
have prevailed despite our aid? if it is weak, our aid will
add little to its resources and could net turn defeat into
life
victory,
have surely embarked on a course which we shall
ha-we continual and increasing occasion to rogret.
\7e can

171
A A

Unitod States, Congressional Record , 69th Ceng., 1st Sess.
1924, LXV, Part 1, 686.
'

172

Ibid ., p. 770.
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net set ourselves up as a holy alliance
bent upon preserving
the status que In the Western Hemisphere. 173

Hiram Johnson continued in the same rein as
he accused Hughes ef
trying to establish himself as the "new iletternioh. 174

Howerer,

despite the efforts of the Congressman, their battle
was futile from
tho beginning as the proposed legislation quickly became
bottled up

in committee,

ilie

cumbersome and tortuous path that a bill must

take through uongross insured inaction on this matter,

hven if it

became law oxer the President's veto, the sale would haTe been com-

pleted and most senators evidently did not see any possible future

use for such a provision.
Also, there was evident in the debate in Congress the propensity

ef seme Americans to take advantage ef our power,

they suggested that

the government receiving our aid should be so grateful as te accept

conditions established by the United states or to agree to concessions

wher'

future disagreements arose.

Although Hughes did net im-

pose any conditions on ubregon in return for our help, seme congress-

men did not want conditions imposed and it indicated a possible
future trend which our policy would take.

Most ef these requests

were mild in relation to the position of Senator Shortridge ef
California,

He suggested that in return for our help, Mexico should

change her Constitution "so to make possible the sale of Lower

l 73 united States, Congressional

apdord . 68th Congress, 1st

3ess., 1924, LXV, Part 2, p. 1408.
174 "A Sleight of Hand Deal in Mexico," Current Opinion .
February, 1924, p. 146.
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California and tht root of tho land in Mexico
around tho Colorado

River to tho Unitod Statw...""5

ait

TOa , fMffl #f

lefiftl

Mack_

mail which oould only engender incroagod
anti-American feeling in
tho republicg to the south of

ug./lt

ig to Hugheg'g orodit that ho

did not ontortain any guch theughtg and that ho did
not require any
conditions.

However, this does not moan that tho United Stateg did

not take advantage of tho faet that Obregen wag in a gerietig
predica-

An argument dere loped when Hughe g maintained that American*

ment.

who had paid taxeg to tho rebels whe controlled the Gulf ports did
not hare to make a second payment to tho Mexican Government when
Federal troops regained the ports. 176

However, Obregon considered

payment of taxes to the rebels as "null and void and that such taxes

must be repaid to the Government. 177
arisen.

Thau, a real conflict had

33m merits of each side in tho ease were not at issue hero

as American handling: of tho dispute was of paramount importance.

Hughes instructed Summerlln "to point out the extent of tho material

and moral assistance which this Government has rendered to tho

Mexican Government during the last few months.

At the same time you

should make it clear in ne uncertain termg that the Government mugt
insist that guch restraint shall not be exercised upon legitimate

American commerce." 17 ®

Hughec wag not reluctant to ugo our aid ag

17 5 New York (Dimes . January
13. 1924, Sec. VII, p. 13.

17 6 Forei,ra Relations. 1924 (Washington, 1939), II, p. 440.
17 7 Ibla .

"<W.

,

p. 444.
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an opening wodfo in hi. dispute with Mexican
authorities to eain the
initial adrantace.

lima, despite his pronouncements in defense of

the emharee, he showed that it could he used as a weapon
to insure

conformity with our demands,

lhe Mexican corernment hacked down as

it did not require that the taxes he paid ac&in.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

After a stalemate of a little ever two years, the
United States
finally recognized the Obregen government en August
31, 1923 after
the Bucarell conference concluded.

Keoognitlon occurred at the time

because Hughes and Coolidge believed that the outstanding
questions
of the past had been settled satisfactorily.

At the conference the

United States had gained what appeared to bo substantial guarantees
In respect to alaims, oil lands and agrarian reform.

Shortly after Obregen was recegnizod, he was faced by a serious
internal crisis which was caused by the upcoming presidential election.

The crisis led to the outbreak of the do la ttuerta revolution.

The initial reaction of the United States government towards the

revolt was not to interfere in the struggle because Hughes believed
that the revolt would bo localized and that Obregen would be able to

crush the insurrection easily.

However by the

fchird

week of December

it became quite evident to Hughes from the reports of our consuls

that either Obregen would be defoated or, at best, it would be a long

drawn out struggle,

ilie

prevailing disorder had an adverse effeot en

American businessmen in Mexico and delayed enactment of the concessions given by the Mexican commissioners at the Bueareli conference*
For these and ether reasons, Hughes developed his policy of "non-

belligerent interposition" which emphasized that the United States
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would aid Obregen
.tability.

U

encourage constitutional procedure,
.rdtr and

ft, result was that Coolidge declared
an embargo en arms

and munitions going t. Mexico except fer
these shipments which were
sent te the Obregen government.

United States aid was sufficient

enough that government forces were able
to take the initiative for
the first time in January.

However, American aid did not include

direct interference in the struggle by the
American government as
the Department of State took steps to try and
eliminate the use of

American adventurers by the Mexican government.

Although these

efforts were unsuccessful, the American government did
not sanction
the use of American pilots by Obregon as Cline inferred.
First of all, 1 would like to state that I wholly agree
with

our decision to fully support Obregon.

If the rebels succeeded, it

would have been either a return te the days of Dias, whieh was nearly
impossible after the Constitution, or a prolonged struggle similar te
that of

"

14.

Halle the decision itself was praiseworthy, the

reasons behind it were dangerous.

«lth Hughes emphasis was placed on

stability and order and he ignored the domestic achievements of
Obregen. 179

'j&us,

the important thing, henceforth, for any Latin

American government was to provide guarantees te American investors
that they would not be molested in their business transactions.
Alv/ays Hughes returned to his main theme that the government had te

insure stability if business was te prosper.

I/O

would judge a

179 Hughes, ihe Pathway of Peace (Hew York, 1925), pp. 98-101
and Hughes, uqr Relations (Princeton, Aew Jersey, 1928), pp. 51-53
and 81-84.
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coremment primarily (and
to kttp order

roadless

It sometime. ...med .ol.ly)
. n ltl ablllty

of what the COTornmont did
d.me.tioally.

In addition, Hu ffhos made, it
quite el.ar that we opposed any
threat
ti the established order.

A Cain Huehoe did net fully
explain that

constituted a justified revolt.

Without this distinotion our polioy

could easily change to one of complete
opposition to all rebellions.
The arm. embargo was an effectiye method
of enforcing our desire to

maintain the status quo.

We

wore denyinff these countries the rifiht

to follow our example of 1775 which
condoned roTolutien.

were

moTini: from the position that rerelutien was
justified at times to

break the shaekles of tyranny, to a completely
new position of eendemainc ae»rty all revolutions which was completely alio*
to our

earlier

b<

itaee.

*ihe

attempt to maintain our position is the world

was also connected with the ability of our businessmen to
C ot from

ether nations the rital raw materials which we lacked.

An attempt

was being; made to maintain the status quo in a world whioh was constantly in moToment.

IVe

were adopting an inflexible policy based

mainly en one factor, stability, while the winds of chance eircumTented the clebe.

In many oases in the future, our arms policy

would be usod to frustrate the aspirations of the masses in a country
In the interests of stability and we would suffer the censequenoes*
V/ithout any doubt, stability is important but wo beoarae blinded by

the magnitude of its importance and failed to take into consideration

ether rital factors such as the wishes of the people.

Intervention

in the interests of democracy usually can be Justified but interyen-
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tit* In tat interests .f maintaining
the status que tan rarely b.
Justified,
Hughes, of course, was net the originator
ef this policy.

Oar

first preoccupation with the word, stability,
was in evidence after
the Spanish-American

power,

'ike

%r

when we first gained recognition as a
world

Piatt Amendment gave ns the right to
intervene in Cuba

whenever it was necessary to preserve political
stability.

The do-

Telepment of this idea continued when Roosevelt distorted
the Monroe
Doctrine.

Net only could we intervene in any Latin American
country

when it was threatened by an external danger, but we ceuld
also exercise our "international police power'* in times of an intornal
crisis.
For any number of reasons we could use th© doctrine of interposition.

Instability was condemned again by our pronounced intention to pre-

vent "chronic wrong-doing" or the "loosening ef the ties of civilized
society."

Again chronic instability should be condemned but our

vague statements ceuld be used as a pretext to Justify any interference which threatened to upset the status quo.

This emphasis en

stability continued under Taft with his policy of "dollar diplomacy."
Investments could only bo made in a society where law and order ex*
is ted.

A break occurred

to some extent in the

American policy makers were pursuing when

new course which

Y/llaon became President*

He changed the major emphasis ef eur poliey frera stability to the

idea that the consent ef the populace was the major factor te be con-

sidered in his famous Mobile address*

As a matter ef fact, he en-

couraffcd instability and disorder to eliminate a dictator. Huerta f
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from the seen..

Of course, Wilson did not
always ri ff idly follow

this policy as ho did intervene,
for instance, in Nicaragua to

promote stability.

But, at least, he reduced our total
emphasis en

stability by injecting a second factor
into the picture namely, a
• onsideration of the aspirations and desires
of the peoplo.

mind,

ifu Ches»s

In my

greatest blunder was not only that he
reverted to the

Roosevelt era but that he reeraphasizod the fact
that stability should
be almost the sole determinant in deciding what
our course of action

should be.

A consideration of the people's desires
was again relo-

cated to a position of minor importance.

Our policy can only im-

prove if we consider a number of factors before deciding
our course
of action.

Just as rovelations stem from multiple causes, our

policy should bo designed to cope with every eventuality with
special
emphasis plaeed on the wishes of the peoplo.

*
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